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I 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. JURISDICTION. This Court has jurisdiction over ". . . 
the final orders and judgments of the district court " 
which jurisdiction futher entitles the court to look at. and 
inquire into the facts of the case leading to a final order and 
judgment. If the objective of justice is though the 
idenification of the properties of Law, then it is essential 
that such properties of Law not be excluded from the case by 
restricting this case to only the trial court's final orders and 
judgment. This Court was purposefully set up to ensure that 
justice was handed out. In contract to classical law. in which 
one focuses on a single varible at a time and attempts to 
"control out" all others, modern law, researches and seeks to 
"control in" as many relevant fact0 as possible within the field 
of contraversy. This Court's intent is a court of intermediate 
or last resort upon which a party roay claim error and obtain a 
reprieve from such error. Therefore the Court must ascertain 
the facts, thinking and discretion leading to the final orders 
and judgments, in an effort to determine if a error or abuse of 
discretion occured. See APPEAL & ERROR 940 - 946. 
2. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS. This appeal is based upon the 
Third District Court's dismissal of a collateral attack upon the 
"Good Faith" of the antecedent Idaho Decree of Divorce. This 
dismissal occured prior to Discovery. Trial of Merits, and 
-1-
before the Findings of Facts, and Conclusion of Law. The court 
reversed its previous ruling voiding the antecepent Idaho Decree 
of Divorce, February 4, 1988, with no new facts and upon the 
presenting of, the "Good Faith Arguement" demands acceptance of 
the document without making it a judgment of the Utah Court. 
And the Court could not question any part thereof. 
II 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in the 
dismissal of the collateral attack of the antecepent Idaho 
Decree of Divorce, without making the document a judgment in the 
Utah courts, reversing the Court's prior decision of February 4, 
1988 that the document was void, lacking jurisdiction over the 
"res", due to the statements made on the document contradicting 
the jurisdictional fact of required residence in the Idaho state. 
2. Such questionable facts as the Trial Court's reversal 
of its decision without any new evidence, without a Trial by 
Merits, and with other questionable issues arising after the 
appearance of the defendant, such as: 
a) The dismissal of a collateral attack on a document, 
solely on blind faith of the document without a trial by merits, 
futher dening discovery into the alledged fraudulent document. 
b) Unresolution of the issue of Res Inter Alios Acta 
(Public actions done by a stranger on someone elses case). 
c) Unresolution of the issue of allegded "conflict of 
interest" being that adverse counsel currently represents the 
plaintiff, as a minor child, in his parents divorce and now 
adverse counsel representing defendant. 
d) Unresolution of the issue of counsel, commiting 
multi-counts of deceit on the court. 
e) Granting of sanctions pursuant to defendant's motion 
(March 29, 1988), prior to service, in a hearing for a motion 
legally before the court on April 1, 1988. With suggestions of 
said sanctions being a punishment for being poor and appearing 
pro se. 
f) Unresolution of four motions for sanctions for 
plaintiff against the defendant. 
Ill 
STATUTES, AND CASE LAW 
1. IDAHO CODE OF LAW, TITLE 32 (Domestic Relations), 
CHAPTER 7 (Divorce Actions), SECTION 32-701 (Residence required 
by plaintiff): 
"32-701. Residence required by plaintiff. - A divorce 
must not be granted unless the plaintiff has been a 
resident of the state a full six (6) weeks next 
preceding the commencement of the action." 
2. IDAHO ACCEPTED CASE LAW: 
"It is essential before a person can lawfully file a 
complaint for divorce that he shall have been actually 
a bona fide resident for six weeks preceding the 
commencement of the action. " HAMPSHIRE v. HAMPSHIRE, 
70 Idaho 522, 223 P.2d 950 (1950) 
3. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
•'The full faith and credit clause does not make a 
sister-state judgment a judgment in another state, but 
to give it that effect, it must be made a judgment 
there, which can be done only if the court purpoting 
to render the orginal judgment had power to pass on 
the merits. (Jurisdictional fact)M WILLIAMS v. NORTH 
CAROLINA 325 US 226. 
4. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
"The full faith and credit clause operates only with 
respect to judgments rendered by a court whose 
jurisdiction, either as to the subject matter or 
person, is not impeached." JUDGMENT SECTION 360 - of 
sisiter states - full faith and credit. 
5. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
"The domicil (is) necessary to support jurisdiction to 
grant divorce, so as to entitle the decree to full 
faith and credit." DIVORCE SECTION 4 - jurisdiction 
to grant - domicil of one spouse as basis. 
6. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
"A judgment refusing to accord full faith and credit 
to the divorce decree of a sister state on the grounds 
that no bona fide domicil was acquired there will not 
be upset by the United States Supreme Court if this 
court finds proper weight was given (sic) to the other 
courts' findings." JUDGMENT 370 - divorce - refusal to 
accord full faith and credit. 
7. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
"The full faith and credit clause of the Federal 
Constitution required the extraterritorial recognition 
of the validity of a divorce decree OBTAINED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS of procedural due 
process in a state by a spouse who UNDER THE LAWS OF 
SUCH STATE had acquired a bona fide domicil there." 
JUDGMENT 370 - full faith and credit of divorce decree 
rendered in sister state. 
8. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
"Th recital in proceedings for divorce, of the facts 
necessary to give jurisdiction, may be contradicted in 
a suit between the same parties in another state.11 
BELL v. BELL 181 US 176. 
9. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
"It is too late now to deny the RIGHT collaterally to 
impeach a decree of divorce made in another State, by 
proof that the court had no jurisdiction, even when 
the record purports to show jurisdiction." WILLIAMS 
v. NORTH CAROLINA 325 US 228 
10. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
"The apperance of the nonresident defendant cannot 
invest a court with jurisdiction of a suit for divorce 
instituted by a person who has no bona fide domicili 
within the state." ANDREW v. ANDREW 188 US 16 
11. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
"Recital of the decrees entered in divorce cases in 
one State are not binding on the court of another 
State." DAVIS v. DAVIS 305 US 34 
12. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
"The bona fides of the residence of a party who 
obtains a divorce in one State may be inquired into by 
the courts of another State." STREITWOLF v. STREITWOLF 
181 US 179 
IV 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Plaintiff was and has been for 26 years prior been a 
citizen of the state of Utah. (Affidavit of Ronald Troy 
Wiedbusch, April 4, 1988) 
2. The parties seperated on or about September 1, 1986. 
(Taken pg 7, Relevant Facts, Respondant's Brief, October 5, 
1988.) 
3. The antecepent Idaho divorce action was filed 
September 29, 1986, twenty eight days after leaving Utah. (Taken 
and date corrected from pg 7, Relevant Facts, Respondant's 
Brief, October 5, 1988.) 
4. Defendant legally could not file a action for divorce 
in the sister-state of Idaho. (Statute and Case Law # 2, this 
document.) 
5. The sister state of Idaho could not grant a valid 
decree of divorce. (Statute and Case Law # 3, this document.) 
V 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1) Even in the most favorable vison of the circumstances, 
not allegations, but facts. Facts taken straight from the 
defendant's own brief, (Case Law and Statute and Case Law # 1-9, 
was presented to the Trial Court) the Trial Court's reversal of 
its prior decision, that the antecepent Idaho decree was void is 
not the view, a reasonable informed person would have taken. 
Futher in the Memorandum Decision the Court mentioned, WILLIAMS 
v. NORTH CAROLINA 325 US 225 by name, but it is very appearant 
the Court did not fully read this Supreme Court decision. For 
it states, the Idaho Decree must be proven before granting of 
good faith. The Court futher stated that domicil implies a 
nexus of such signifance as to create legal relations. By 
refusing to allow the collateral attack against the Idaho Decree 
for lack of domicil, the Trial Court in essence overruled 
the US Supreme Court ( Statute and Case Law # 7). In that the 
domicil must be acquired in accordance with Idaho law, the Trial 
Court stated in essence, the act of filing in the sister-state 
of Idaho, was of such signifance as to legally create a domicil. 
The Court totally ignored that certain guidelines must be meet, 
to regulate such matters, to wit, a period of residence. This is 
the very question presented to the United States Supreme Court in 
the Court's cited case. In which, the Supreme Court upheld that 
even if, the party goes to a sister-state, fulfills the required 
period of residence, to acquire a bona fide domicil, the decree 
will be impeached, for lack of domicil, if the party went for 
the purpose of obtaining a divorce. The Defendant in this case 
can not even claim that she even tried to acquire a bona fide 
domicil. And without even a domicil, no reasonable person would 
taken the Trial Court's view. Especially when the Supreme Court 
ruled that the mere act of fleaing to a sister-state to get 
divorce voids the domicil. The Trial Court upheld a decree with 
no domicil, and a person who filed within days of leaving Utah 
solely for the purpose to acquire a divorce, and defraud the 
State of Utah and the plaintiff of their respective rights. 
2) That the position of dismissal of the collateral 
attack on the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce before 
Discovery, a Trial by merits. Findings of Facts, and Conclusion 
of Law, is unreasonable even in the most favorable light, when 
the document is alledged to been acquired by fraud, and contained 
fraud as to the real legal relationship of the parties as to 
minor children. 
3. The position of unresolution of the issue of Res Inter 
Alios Acta, in the circumstances, of the finding of the court, 
that the defendant disappeared upon service, the Ordering of 
service by letter, and the surprise appearance eleven (11) days 
prior to the Default Hearing, is not a reasonable position, in 
light of such diversity of facts and questions. Such as why 
wasn't default entered against the Defendant. (Service January 
11, 1988, Appearance March 7, 1988 Default Hearing March 18, 
1988). Futher the adverse Counsel's lack knowledge of the 
defendant, her financial circumstance, the Order that she 
disappeared, her default, and his futher failure to cooperate in 
discovery. 
4. That the position of the unresolution of the known 
conflict of interest between adverse counsel and his client, is 
futher unreasonable. The Court has a undisputed affidavit of 
Diana Kay Buie, March 9, 1988 attesting to this fact, futher 
ascertaining that adverse counsel has access to psychological 
reports, homestudies, and other sentitive information acquired 
on the plaintiff as a minor child. The adverse counsel unoffical 
denial of such, without affidavit or other offical evidence, is 
not grounds upon which a reasonable personae would leave 
unresolved. 
5. The position of not resolving, if facts, that were 
presented are true, or false, is not a position to which one 
would make a decision upon. That such an issue should and 
would be of paramount importance, before a informed and fair 
decision could in fact be handed down. The question must be 
asked what prompts a Court to make a final and absolute decision 
without knowing what is truth and what is fiction. 
5. The position of granting sanctions pursuant to the 
adverse counsel's motion, (March 29, 1988) against the plaintiff 
before the legal service of said motion upon him, futher to hear 
it without being set for hearing, and then to grant sanctions 
accordingly (April 1, 1988) is not reasonable. 
6. The position of leaving the unresolution of the four 
complaints of violation of Rule 11, without hearing, without 
objections, without good cause otherwise is not reasonable, and 




1) The facts presented by the defendant in her 
Respondant's brief, show that the antecepent Idaho Decree of 
Divorce was void, as to jursidiction over the Res. That the view 
the Trial court pursued is not one which a reasonable person 
would have adopted. That such oversees any presumption that 
this Court must attribute to the Trial Court as the defendant 
claims in her brief. 
This is uphold by the following Case Law: 
Dawson v. Weems, 352 So.2d 1200, Fla.App. (1977); Lemons v. St. 
John's Hospital of Salina, 613 P.2d 957, 5 Kan.App.2d 161 
(1980); Sapp v. Wong, 609 P.2d 137, 62 Haw. 34 (1980); Turney v. 
Ford Motor Co., 50 111.Dec. 85, 418 N.E.2d 1079, 94 Ill.App.3d 
678 (1981); David B. v. DeVito, 41 111.Dec. 853, 408 N.E.2d 275, 
86 Ill.App.3d 787 (1980); Pisciotta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 385 
So.2d 1176 (1979); Hartung v. Hartung, 306 N.W.2d 16, 102 Wis.2d 
58 (1981); Maler Const, v. Ryan, 260 N.W.2d 700, 81 Wis.2d 463 
(1978). 
That this Court has the right to review the facts leading to the 
final judgment, and must revise the trial court's decision if it 
is plain the court is beyond reason and its action is capricious 
and arbitrary. 
Livengood v. Sechier, 382 So.2d 567 Ala.Civ.App. (1980); Baumier 
v. Baumier, 368 So.2d 864. Ala.Civ.App. (1976); Correa v. 
Curbey. 605 P.2d 458, 124 Ariz.App. 480 (1979); Midwest Lime Co. 
v. Independence County Chancery Court, 551 S.W.2d 537. 261 Ark. 
695 (1977); Volpicelli v. Jared Sydney Torrance Memorial 
Hospital, 167 Cal.Rptr. 610, 109 C.A.3d 242 Cal.App. (1980); 
Sandstrom v. Larsen, 583 P.2d 971, 59 Haw. 491. 1 A.L.R.4th 1009 
(1978); Hawaiian Ocean View Estate v. Pacific Laudry Co., 564 
P.2d 436, 58 Haw. 63 (1977); In re Marriage of Preston, 37 
111.Dec 442, 402 N.E.2d 332, Ill.App.3d 789 (1978); Mergenthaler 
Linotype Co. v. Leonard Storch Enterprises, 23 I11.Dec. 352, 383 
N.E.2d 1379, 66 Ill.App.3d 789 (1978); City of Elkhart v. 
Middleton. 356 N.E.2d 207, 265 Ind. 514 (1976); Whitman v. 
Whitman, 405 N.E.2d 608, Ind.App. (1980); In re Marriage of 
Miles, 362 N.E.2d 171, 173 Ind.App. 5 (1977); New England Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Coram. 390 A.2d 8 (1978); Krichmar 
v. Krichmar, 397 N.Y.S.2d 775, 42 N.Y.2d 8585. 366 N.E.2d 863 
(1977); Durante v. Frishing, 438 N.Y.S.2d 128, 81 A.D.2d 968 
(1977); Ellis v. Hoelzel, 394 N.Y.S.2d 91, 57 A.D.2d 968 (1977); 
St. Viadimir Uk. Orth. Church v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins., 362 
A.2d 1052, 239 Pa.Super. 492 (1976); Quaker City Yacht Club v. 
Williams, 429 A.2d 1204 (1981); Pratt v. Texas Dept. Human 
Resource, 614 S.W.2d 490, Tex.App. (1981); Bennett v. Northcutt, 
544 S.W.2d 703. Tex.Civ.App. (1976); Peatross v. Board of Com'rs 
of Salt Lake, 555 P.2d 281. Utah (1976); Hartung v. Hartung. 306 
N.W.2d 16. 102 Wis.2d 58; Conrad v. Conrad, 284 N.W.2d 674, 92 
Wis.2d 407 (1979) 
The case must show a strong discretion, judical discretion is 
abused when judical action is arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable, or where no reasonable man would take the view 
adopted by the court. 
Ex parte Guerdon Industries, 373 So.2d 322, Ala. (1979); 
Williamson-Johns v. Johns, 355 So.2d 706, Ala. (1978); Saunderson 
v. Saunderson, 379 So.2d 91, Ala.Civ.App. (1980); Baumier v. 
Baumier, 368 So.2d 864, Ala.Civ.App. (1979); Smith v. Smith, 
369 So.2d 1235, Ala.Civ.App. (1978); Interlink Cotton Gin v. 
Elmer Tallant Ins., 361 So.2d 604, Parsons v. Parsons, 337 So.2d 
765, Ala.Civ.App. (1976), Tobeluk v. Lind. 589 P.2d 487, Alaska 
(1979); Haskins v. Shelden, 558 P.2d 487 Alaska (1976), In re 
Richard E., 579 P.2d 495, 146 Cal.Rptr. 604, 21 C.3d 349 (1978); 
Rich v. City of Benicia, 159 Cal.Rptr. 473, 98 C.A.3d 428, 
Cal.App. (1979); People v. Mobile Magic Sales, 157 Cal.Rptr. 
749, 96 C.A.3d 14, Cal.App. (1979); Adoption of D.S.C., 155 
Cal.Rptr. 406, 93 C.A.3d 14, Cal.App. (1979); Whitcombe v. Yolo 
County, 141 Cal.Rptr. 189. 73 C.A.3d 698, Cal.App. (1977) 
The Court must conceded that such a weight of Case Law, and 
the facts of the case, the Trial Court did not have strong 
discretion to uphold the denial of Discovery, a Trial of Merits, 
Finding of Facts, and Conclusions of Law, and just arbitrarily, 
fanciful and with no reason to dismiss the collateral attack on 
the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce. This Complaint 
complained of fraud, as to domicli, and fraud as to the facts 
recited upon the Decree. 
Rather, there is strong discretion, that if the defendant 
seperated on September 1, 1986, and filed on September 29, 1986, 
that she did not acquire a domcilem in the state of Idaho. 
Futher, the Decree recites that the legal relationship 
of children is none, and contains a provision the defendant is 
uncertain if pregnant, and the complaint alledged that there was 
in fact a child, and the defendant sought to keep such fact 
secret, which very strongly suggest fraud as to possiblity of 
children. 
The complaint futher alledged that the defendant was a drug 
addict, said child is in paramount danger, and is being raised 
in a drug envirorment. No reasonable person, in the light of 
such facts, as the strong possible of the defendants lack of 
domicilus, voiding the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce, for 
lack of jurisdiction over the rem. Strong possible fraud as to 
the misrepresentation of the parties possible child, the child 
being held by a drug addict, and in a drug envirorment, would 
just arbitrary, and fancifully dismiss the action prior to 
Discovery, Trial of Merits, Findings of Fact, and Conclusion of 
Law. Especially with three strong affidavits in support 
thereof, and no contrary evidence. With four US Supreme Court 
rulings stating with ferocity that the plaintiff has the right 
to Discovery, a Trial of Merits, notwithstanding the presence of 
the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce, said cases were mentioned 
in the Memorandum Decision. This dismissal was not based in 
discretion, but was arbitrary, fanciful, and unreasonable, and 
no reasonable person would have adopted the view adopted by the 
trial court, on the day set for the Default Hearing. 
The defendant futher argues that the Court must just accept 
the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce, because it recites the 
jurisdictional fact, and at the awardment of the decree, the 
defendant had finally attained her Idaho citizenship. 
The antecepent Idaho Decree must be accepted without 
being made a judgment here, as the trial court did, is contrary 
to Statute and Case Law # 3 , a US Supreme Court ruling. 
To award the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce good 
faith prior to determination of of the issue of its jurisdiction 
over the rem, as the trial court did, is contrary to Statute and 
Case Law # 4 , a US Supreme Court judgment. 
The determination of domicilis is a esstantial part in 
the determination if said decree is entitled to full faith and 
credit, to blindly uphold the domicilem, as the trial court did, 
is contrary to Statute and Case Law # 5 , a US Supreme Court 
the standard for the nation. 
The determination if such a decree is entitled to full 
faith and credit will be upheld if the Supreme Court finds proper 
consideration was given to each of the determining court's 
Finding of Facts, that such determination was not arbitrary, or 
fanciful. That such encompasses a Trial of Merits, to dismiss 
the action, as the trial court did, prior to a trial and on the 
day set for the Default Hearing, is in violation of Statutes 
and Case Law # 6 , a US Supreme Court's judgment. 
Each of the above violations were known to the trial court, 
and are all stated on the first page, of WILLIAMS v. NORTH 
CAROLINA, 325 US 226, which is mentioned by named in the 
Memorandum Decision. To knowingly overrule the US Supreme Court 
is not reasonable, and is simple arbitrary and fanciful. 
That in the Trial of Merits the Court must determine is the 
antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce was obtained by the Defendant 
in accordance with the requirements of procedural due process in 
that state, futher the court must determine under the laws of 
that state if the defendant had in fact acquired a bona fide 
domicil there. To do otherwise, as the trial court did, is 
contrary to Statute and Case Law # 7 , a US Supreme Court 
judgment. 
The defendant's argument of the plaintiff's being 
personally served and entering court papers invested the Idaho 
forum with jurisdiction. Such an argument is not based upon 
law, but is arbitrary and fanciful. This is a direct conflict 
with Statute and Case Law #10, a US Supreme Court ruling. 
The defendant's argument that the court can not inquire 
into the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce, and the defendant's 
domicil. That the plaintiff must seek relief in the foreign 
state of Idaho, is also not based upon the law, but is fanciful 
thinking. That such is contrary to Statute and Case Law # 12, a 
US Supreme Court ruling. 
The defendant's argument that Utah can not collaterally 
impeach its sister-states decree is futher not based upon the 
law, and is contrary to Statute and Case Law # 9 , a US Supreme 
ruling. 
The defendant's lastest argument presented in her brief, 
that the court must accept the antecepent Idaho Decree of 
Divorce because it recites the jurisdictional fact, is capricious 
and lacks a base in the law. It stands contrary to Statute and 
Case Law # 8 , a US Supreme Court ruling, that the recital of the 
facts necessary to give jurisdiction, may be contradicted in a 
suit by the same parties in another state. It futher is 
contrary to Statute and Case Law #11, a US Supreme Court 
ruling, in which the Supreme Court Orders that the recital of 
the decrees entered in divorce cases in the sister state of 
Idaho are not binding on the courts of Utah. 
Recitals of the decrees may be contradicted. And are not 
binding upon a court of another state. Futher a divorce 
acquired by a party in one state, the domicil may be questioned. 
Bell v. Bell, 181 US 175; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 US 179; 
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 US 14; Haddock v. Haddock, 210 US 502; 
Simmons v. Simmons, 57 D.C.App. 216; Cheeley v. Clayton, 110 Us 
701; Frey v. Frey, 61 D.C.App. 232. 
The fact the record of the divorce decree in Idaho recites 
the jurisdictional fact of residence can make no difference. 
Hard v. Shipman, 6 Barb. 623; Bolton v. Schriever, 135 UY 73; 
Matter of Law, 56 App Div 454; Ferguson v. Crawford, 70 NY 273; 
Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall 457; Thorman v. Frame, 176 US 350; 
Plant v. Harrison, 36 Misc. Rep. 649. 
The recitals of facts in a decree may be contradicted as to 
the facts neccessary to give the court jurisdiction; and, if it 
be shown that such facts did not exist, the record will be a 
nullity, notwithstanding it may recite that they did exist. 
Bell v. Bell, 181 US 175; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall 457, 21 L 
ed 897; Knowles v. Logansports gaslight & Coke Co. 19 Wall 61, 
22 L ed 72; Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass 156, 23 Am Rep 299; 
Shannon v. Shannon, 4 Allen 134; Leith v. Leith, 39 N.H. 20; 
Gregory v. Gregory, 78 Me 187, 57 Am Rep 299; Cross v. Cross, 
108 NY 628, 15 NE 333; Kerr v. Kerr, 41 NY 272; People v. 
Dawell, 25 Mich 247, 22 Am Rep 260; Reed v. Reed, 52 Mich 121, 
50 Am Rep 247, 17 NW 720; Chaney v. Byran, 15 Lea 589. 
To argue that the recital of the jurisdictional fact was 
upon the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce warrents it to blind 
acceptance is utterly not based in acceptable law. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of this Court will set forth the grounds for 
the collateral attack of foreign sister-states decrees against 
Utah citizens. That the Court will now determine if the 
citizens are protected from fraudulent illegal actions, or fair 
game for every deceitful 1 person in the country. 
The Court has been fully advised with the evidence that was 
presented to the trial court. Such evidence which strongly 
discerns that dismissal of the plaintiff's action, in such 
strong facts even admitted by the defendant, in her brief, was 
not the actions of reason. But was done arbitrary and 
fancifully, standing as a huge abuse of discretion. 
It was proven that the plaintiff has always resided in this 
state, of Utah. From the defendant's relevant facts, she states 
she left the plaintiff on the 1st day of September, 1986. She 
went straight way to the foreign sister-state of Idaho. She less 
than 29 days later, filed a action for divorce in Idaho. 
It has futher been proven that the sister-state of Idaho 
has proclaimed that such is a unlawfully filing, in their 
courts. See Statute and Case Law # 2. And it was shown, the 
Idaho people have forbidden the courts of the sister-state of 
Idaho to issue a Decree of Divorce unless a person has lived in 
Idaho for six (6) weeks before a person files in their courts 
for divorce. 
Such strong evidence is ample for even this Court to impeach 
the sister state of Idaho's antecepent Decree of Divorce. 
For the trial court, to know of the US Supreme Court's 
rulings, judgments, ferociously forbiding the court to grant 
blind faith to the decree, and to go ahead and do such a action, 
is beyond law. For the trial court to overlook the US Supreme 
Court's Command to the trial court, to make the Idaho judgment a 
judgment in Utah, the trial court's overlooking the US Supreme 
Court's Command to the trial court, to make a determination of 
the Idaho's courts jurisdiction, the trial court's overlooking 
the US Supreme Court's Command to the trial court, that the 
trial court must make a determination of domicilis, the US 
Supreme Court's saying this determination is essential to 
determine if the antecepent Idaho Decree of Divorce is even 
entitled to full faith and credit, and last, the trial court 
overlooking of the US Supreme Court's command, to the trial 
court, that the determination of full faith and credit, must 
have the weight of the court's proper consideration, and such a 
determination, being of such paramount importance, due to its 
infringement of each States' and each parties rights, the US 
Supreme Court commanding the trial court that such a 
determination MUST NOT be arbitrary, or fanciful, and for the 
trial court to just arbitrarily dismiss such a paramount issue, 
without discovery, without a trial of merits, without findings 
of facts, without conclusions of law, can not be construed to be 
anything but unreasonable, and no reasonable person would take 
this view, the same view which was adopted by the trial court. 
Then to have the trial court to have claimed to have read 
WILLIAMS v. NORTH CAROLINA 325 US 226, when on the first page, 
page 226, the very page the US Supreme Court reiterates each the 
foregoing commands is total and absolute abuse of discretion. 
The defendant has taken the stance that the plaintiff is 
asking for extra-ordinary relief. The plaintiff is asking only 
for the chance to prove his case. The chance for discovery to 
acquire evidence of such, to show beyond a shadow of doubt, that 
his allegations are in fact true. The chance for a trial of 
merit, to present his evidence, to a court of law. The chance 
to obtain a redress from the grievances he complains from. 
Such is not extra-ordinary relief. 
The plaintiff now comes to this court, complains of two 
errors, 1) how could the trial court rule on the Motion for 
Sanctions (March 29, 1988) prior to service and grant damages in 
favor of the defendant against the plaintiff, 2) the US Supreme 
Court, ferocily upholds the plaintiff right to discovery, trial 
by merits, and redress, but the trial court abused its 
discretion, and arbitrarily dismissed the action. 
These are the errors the plaintiff complains of and ask for 
reprieve from the trial court's abuse. The US Supreme Court 
commands that such a paramount action as this, each issue must 
be given the full weight of the court's determination. This 
surely cannot be done, without discovery, trial by merit, and no 
reasonable person would attempt to make a determination prior to 
such. With the weight of evidence strongly suggest, the 
truthfullness of the invalidity of the antecepent Idaho Decree 
of Divorce. 
THEREFORE the plaintiff prays for this Court to uphold his 
appeal, and protect this States' and his rights. 
DATED this the 25th day of October, 1988. 
^ J j & ^ S ^ U v ^ 
R. Troy Stfeker, Appel lant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigns hereby certifies that four copies of the 
foregoing document entitled "REPLY BRIEF" was sent to the 
adverse counsel, Peter W. Guyon, Attorney for Cindy Lou Baker, 
and was personally served at his office of 10 Exchange Place # 
614, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DATED this the 25th day of October, 1988. 
&2 
P . Erad HaEingill 
M t tor n* > at Lai « 
F . 0 . E o 4 17 
(in i«er , Idaho P r <£~* 2 
Telephone: 549-0 tt^ 
If J THE DISTFICT COURT OF THE THIRD J U D I C I M L DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUtm OF WASHINGTON 
CINDY' LOU HIErBUSCH, * Ca = € N 
-.3dLSL 
Plaintiff, 
RONALD TROY UIEDBUSCH, 
> Fee Categor : 
* Fee : $>t>± . 0 0 
C O M - L H I N T FOF PI1 'C.PCE 
Def end=»n t . 
CONES NOM , the a b e e nameo F 1 A I n t \ + * and for claim +nr rje 1 i <=4 
a ga • n = t the =» bo» J ^  n ?me d D* + e n d =• n + , c omp lain? a n d :-l 1 egp : 3 E t o1 1 o» »= : 
past has been a bona fide citizen and»re=1d*nt of thf £*at«E of if ia*-«o . 
II . 
T h a t t h e P l a i n t i f f a n d D e f e n d a n t n ^ r e m a r r i e d i n Sa l t - Le!*e 
C r t y , U t a h on t h e 2 2 n d da> o f A p r i l , l ^ S c , s i n c e u h i c h t i m e thfey h a - ^ 
b e e n a n d now a r e h u s b a n d a n d w i f e . f 
III. J2? f^0> 
T h a t the P l a i n t i f f a n d D e f e n d a n t s e p a r a t e d on or i o o u t t h e 
no children bnr n of this marriage. 
w. 
That during the term of this marriage the parties have 
accumulated a small amount of communit/ property. The Plaintiff 
shall be entitled to: 
1. Separate propertv consisting of: 
a.. Bibles and bible literature; and 
b. Stud/ books; and 
c. Cassette tapes; and 
d. Exercisers, including Hi»thout limitation, a 5-minute 
exerciser and isometric exerciser; and 
e. Personal effects and belongings; and 
f. Religious pictures; and 
2 . Commun i t / pr opert»' consisting of : 
a. Unicorn poster and stuf+'^d Garfield doll; and 
b» One half of wedding pictures and mementos ; and 
c. All other personal pr op e r t > not otherwise specifically 
g i K'en to Defendant. 
3. That the Defendant shall be entitled to the following 
personal proper t> , whether separate or community: 
a. One set of books on commodities and finances; and 
b. Howard Puff tapes; and 
C. All wedding gifts; *nd 
d. Unicorn handlerch«e x; and 
e. Two 12 inch by 8 inch plastic posters; and 
f. All defendant's personal effects and belongings. 
That the Defendant shall pe> all community debts and hold 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. That all other debts incurred by each 
party hereto, subsequent to the date of separation, shall remain the 
sole and separate debt of the parties so incurring that debt, and the 
other party being held harmless therefrom. 
\J i> 
That there have been 
ui i . 
Th a t the D e f e n d a n t and PI ai n t i f f shall divide e q u a l l y any 
r e f u n d of S t a t e or Federal income tax for the year 1 9 8 6 , the 
P l a i n t i f f to r e c e i v e o n e - h a I f thereof and the D e f e n d a n t to R e c e i v e 
o n e - h a l f t h e r e o f . 
UI I I . 
T h a t c e r t a i n i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s have arisen b e t w e e n 
the p a r t i e s , such that they are p r e c l u d e d f r o m c o n t i n u i n g to live 
t o g e t h e r as h u s b a n d and w i f e , and P l a i n t i f f is e n t i t l e d to a D e c r e e of 
D i v o r c e f r o m the D e f e n d a n t upon tfye g r o u n d of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e 
d i f f e r e n c e s. 
IX. 
T h a t the D e f e n d a n t be r e q u i r e d to e x e c u t e , c o n v e y , t r a n s f e r 
or d e l i v e r any and all d o c u m e n t s n e c e s s a r y to the transfer of any 
title a s s e t s or other a s s e t s , w h i c h are the su b j e c t of any of the 
f o r e g o i n g p a r a g r a p h s of this C o m p l a i n t . 
X. 
T h a t the P l a i n t i f f ' s m a i d e n name of Cindy Lou Baker be 
r e s t o r e d to h e r . 
W H E R E F O R E , P l a i n t i f f p r a y s for .Judgment against the D e f e n d a n t 
as follows: (^^MfU ^o uidfik. U^U clicks U| W « A C . ~W> X ^ U o , • 
1. P l a i n t i f f be g r a n t e d a d i v o r c e f r o m D e f e n d a n t on the 
g r o u n d s of i r r e c o n c i U b l e d i f f e r e n c e s . 
2. That the property/debts be divided as set forth herein. 
DATED this the J2? day of Sep tember, 1986. 
R . Br ad Mas i ng i 1 1 
A t tor ne y for Plaintiff 
R, Troy Staker (Wiedbusch) 
Plaintiff 
208 South Main # 38 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Te1ephone: 562-2568 
IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD TROY WIEDBUSCH (STAKER), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CINDY LOU WIEDBUSCH (BAKER), 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD 
TROY WIEDBUSCH. 
Civil No. D-37-4844 
Judge Scott Daniels 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: 55. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Ronald Troy Wiedbusch, being first duly sworn, do 
hereby and upon oath swear and state as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above named action, and I 
am fully competent to testify as to all matters hereinafter 
set forth: 
2. I have never in person or any other manner, have 
and/or tried to, transact business anywhere in the State of 
Idaho; 
3. I have never in person or any other manner, 
have and/or tried to, committ a tortius act anywhere in the 
State of Idaho} 
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4. I have never in person or any other manner, have 
and/or tried to, own any real estate anywhere in the State 
of Idaho; 
5. I have never in person, or any other manner, have 
and/or tried to, insure anything anywhere in the State of 
Idaho; 
6. I have never in person, or any other manner, have 
and/or tried to maintain a "Domicile", of any sort, 
anywhere in the State of Idaho; 
7. I have never in person or any other manner, ever 
committed any acts of any sort, to give rise to a cause for 
divorce, anywhere in the State of Idaho; 
3. I have never in person or any other manner, ever 
lived, resided, and/or stayed, at any time or in any way 
anywhere in the State of Idaho, for even one day; 
9- I have never in any way, intentionally, consented to 
the jurisdiction of The District Court, of the Third Judical 
District, State of Idaho, In and for the County of 
Washington; 
10. I have never committed any action as outlined, in 
Title 5-514 of Idaho Law, entitled Acts submitting a 
non-resident to jurisdiction of Idaho Courts. 
-2-
11. That if no act was done to grant jurisdiction 
proceeding the action, that the act of defending oneself 
against said action does not constitue an act upon which 
jurisdiction can be seized, this Right to defend, without 
granting jurisdiction or submission, is granted under the 
9th Admendment of the Constitution of the Untied States. 
DATED this the 4th Day of April, 1988. 
R. Troy Wiepbusch (Staker) 
Plaintif-KO 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this the 4th day of 
April, 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC Residing a^t 
Salt Lake County. _ J 
My Commission Expires: 
